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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS	
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4	SINGULAR COMPUTING LLC,)	
5	Plaintiff) Civil Action	
6) No. 19-12551-FDS)	
7	GOOGLE LLC,	
8	Defendant)	
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10	BEFORE: MAGISTRATE JUDGE DONALD L. CABELL	
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13	STATUS CONFERENCE CONDUCTED BY VIDEO CONFERENCE	
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15	John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse	
16	1 Courthouse Way Boston, MA 02210	
17		
18	July 22, 2021	
19	1:30 p.m.	
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22		
23	Valerie A. O'Hara, FCRR, RPR	
24	Official Court Reporter John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse	
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4	
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1 PROCEEDINGS THE CLERK: This is the case of Singular 2 3 Computing, LLC vs. Google, LLC, Civil Action 4 Number 19-12551 will now be heard before this court. 5 Would counsel please identify themselves for the 6 record. 7 THE COURT: Starting with plaintiff. MR. SEEVE: This is Brian Seeve of Prince, 8 Lobel, Tye representing plaintiff Singular Computing, LLC 9 11:01AM 10 in this matter, and I believe I'm joined by several 11 colleagues. I'm not sure if they've joined the call yet. 12 MR. GANNON: Your Honor, Kevin Gannon, no video, 13 but I'm on as well. 14 MR. FULFORD: Tom Fulford. THE COURT: I'm sorry, could you repeat your 15 16 name again. We have a court reporter, so I want to be --17 I want to make sure she's able to capture everything. So 18 who was that? Oh, Tom Fulford, F-u-l-f-o-r-d. All 19 right. Good morning. 11:01AM 20 MR. GANNON: Yes, I'm Kevin Gannon on as well 21 for Singular. 22 THE COURT: All right. That sounded a little 23 garbled, it sounds, but the screen that lit up was Kevin 24 Gannon. 25 MR. ERCOLINI: Michael Ercolini for Singular.

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THE COURT: Good morning.
                     MR. ERCOLINI: Good morning, your Honor.
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                     MR. KAMBER: As for us, your Honor,
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            Matthias Kamber of Keker, Van Nest & Peters on behalf of
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            Google.
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                     THE COURT: Good morning.
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                     MR. KAMBER: Good morning.
                     MS. YBARRA: Good morning, your Honor,
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            Michelle Ybarra, Keker, Van Nest & Peters also on behalf
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            of Google.
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                     THE COURT: Good morning.
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                     MR. SPEED: Good morning, your Honor,
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            Nathan Speed from Wolf, Greenfield & Sacks also on behalf
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            of Google.
     15
                     THE COURT: Good morning.
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                     MS. PORTO: Good morning, your Honor, Anna Porto
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            also on behalf of Google.
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                     THE COURT: Good morning to you. Okay. Let me
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            just set the stage for this. This all began with us
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            getting an e-mail from you folks I think starting from
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            Singular, and Google has weighed in, and it does give me
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            occasion to maybe reaffirm or restate something that I
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            said last time we got an e-mail from you guys, I'm fine
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            with getting e-mails asking for opportunities to sit and
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            talk to see if we can help the parties work through
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matters, but, again, when we typically do that, it's usually for something that's much smaller, much more bite-sized, much simpler than what we've got going on here.

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Usually it arises in a context where counsel realizes in talking that they may have a disagreement on something, nobody wants to file a motion, per se, so they say let's talk to the Court and maybe getting a third person weighing in or something like that.

What we got here is more involved in that. It does appear to relate in part to prior rulings I've made, but it also suggests there are anticipated issues that the parties may have some concerns about as well, so it's kind of a multi-part beast.

So the informal, off the record type conferences that we are willing to have are not suitable for things like that. So I asked Ms. Russo to make this a conference. This is somewhere in between what I usually envision at a contested hearing where there's a pending motion. We do not have a pending motion. I do know that Google filed a motion for protective order, but there's really no pending motion before me, so this is somewhere in the middle.

We do have a court reporter, so this is on the record, so I want there to be a certain amount of order

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to this. We don't have unlimited time, so we're going to get to it in a moment because we have other matters going on, but to the extent any of our conversations implicate prior rulings of mine, I think it's perfectly appropriate for us to talk about those.

The parties can remind me of things I may have said or done or how I ruled, and I will try to act consistent with anything that I've said or done in the past or understandings that the parties have had.

If we're talking about future stuff, well, I'm not sure we'd get into that today, particularly since Google has filed a motion for protective order. I looked at that just very quickly before I got on screen, and the essence of that though appears to be actually straightforward, which is really just make everybody play by whatever our prior understandings and rulings suggested, so maybe we get to that, maybe not, but Singular, let me start with you, and let's start by trying to frame things in terms of something that you think is going on in this case that is contrary to something I said or a ruling I made previously, and then we'll see where the conversation takes us from there.

MR. ERCOLINI: If it's limited to that, your Honor, I think we have two issues, although it does implicate the motion to compel, the third issue, and

that's actually a very brief issue to talk about, but basically in the past week, Google has effectively failed to appear for three depositions.

The rule on this is pretty straightforward. If the deposition is noticed, you need to appear, you can't refuse to appear on account of your objections, and the witness has to be prepared to testify as to the notice topics, and a failure to prepare is tantamount to a failure to appear -- so, failure to prepare, excuse me, is tantamount to a failure to appear, as is the failure to designate a witness, so the only exception is if you have a protective order or if the motion for protective order is pending. Neither is the case.

Last Friday, after about nine months of pursuing a 30(b)(6) witness from Google on damages, Google showed up with a witness who was not prepared to testify on the topics for which he was designated. Instead, Google had decided it was going to basically insert its own topic, and that's what the witness would be prepared to testify on.

This was not only in spite of there being no protective order, more importantly, it was in defiance of what the Court instructed Google to do in response to Singular's motion to compel on June 30th.

Specifically, Google was to provide testimony on

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any financial analysis or any analysis as to the value of the accused TPUs, to other business units, including ads, search, YouTube.

Google even claimed at the hearing that it didn't object to providing that information to the extent it existed, so we expected to get a witness who was going to testify on that.

Instead, during the hearing, and to be clear, we moved to compel on that topic. But I'll just read that topic so everyone is clear on what it isn't, that it actually lines up with what the Court instructed Google to do because I don't want there to be any ambiguity about it.

Just a moment. So, I'm just pulling the topic up. So, quantifications, evaluations, estimates of the value to Google of the benefits of using the accused products is tied directly to the accused products, including but not limited to improved search results, advertising placements, increases in volume of search and advertising, increased revenues, profits, advertising rates, click-through rates, so we expected to get a witness who could testify on this. I think it's pretty clear that's within the scope of what Google said it was going to provide.

Instead, Ms. Ybarra during the deposition when

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the witness, Mr. Patil, was asked whether he was prepared to testify on that topic, Ms. Ybarra responded. I just want to pull up the quote so I'm not mischaracterizing what Ms. Ybarra said.

Apologies, I have this highlighted, I just want to make sure I get the right person in the transcript.

Bear with me just a moment. I'm sorry. Okay. So, when we asked about the topic and what Mr. Patil did to prepare, Ms. Ybarra objected and said Google agreed to present Dr. Patil on this topic to testify about comparisons between the accused v2 and TPU v3 and I'll turn it into machine learning.

That was exactly what they had objected in the responses and objections to the original notice, and we had moved to compel after they had given this objection, so Google brought its own topic to the deposition. The witness wasn't prepared to testify. That's one of a host of topics that basically followed this same pattern.

So we had another deposition on Tuesday, another 30(b)(6) witness, and the expectation was that he was going to be prepared to testify, but after Friday, we thought we should get confirmation on exactly what he was prepared to testify on and what he wouldn't be. So we sent Google an e-mail the day before, listed the topics and asked them to confirm that he'd be prepared to

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testify as to the scope of those topics, and if he wasn't, what portions of the topics he would be prepared to testify to and what portions he would not.

We asked three separate times for that information. We did not get it, and the third time we asked, Google threatened to cancel the deposition. They then actually canceled the deposition and withdrew the witness when we would not agree to accept their scope of topics that they had imposed.

So we told them we were going to show up for the deposition. They showed up for the deposition at 9:15, and I will just read from the record what Ms. Ybarra said before we started the deposition because we did not get to ask a single question, but this was the demand that Google made of us before we asked a single question.

We were prepared to proceed with the deposition today only upon Singular's confirmation that Mr. Ercolini will limit his questions properly to the scope of the topics as agreed and discussed with the Court and not seek additional time with Mr. Shafiei or any 30(b)(6) witness on those same topics, so the expectation was we were to waive any rights to seek further testimony from Mr. Shafiei without asking the question about whether he was prepared about any of the topics and to waive any further questions on those 30(b)(6) topics regardless of

whether or not the witness was prepared.

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THE COURT: Hang on. I'm not sure I processed that statement that way. I thought the way you said it was you were asking to confirm that you were going to be limiting your questions to those topics that had been agreed to either in court or by the Court, which is to say we fought about this, we reached some equilibrium, some agreement on what would be fair game, and we're trying to get you to agree ahead of time you're going to stay within the parameters of what we agreed to. Is that incorrect?

MR. ERCOLINI: The problem was that there was a clear disconnect on what the parties agreed to, and we knew that based on the date of the Friday deposition and the night before that they would not confirm what he was prepared to testify on and what he would not be, and it was clearly not an agreement with what the Court had instructed them to provide a witness on.

THE COURT: So now going to this phrase about what I had instructed because I know that we not too long ago had a get-together that was kind of the informal conference where it was just kind of us talking, and we may have -- there may have been some understandings reached then as distinguished from prior rulings of mine, so what you're concerned about now, does it flow from an

actual ruling, or does it flow from some sort of informal 1 agreement that the parties reached when we last convened 2 on Zoom? 3 4 MR. ERCOLINI: There were two instructions 5 during that hearing. The first instruction was that --6 THE COURT: When you say the hearing, I'm sorry. MR. ERCOLINI: The hearing on June 30th that we 7 had. I can pull the transcript on that. 8 9 THE COURT: Let's not call that a hearing unless 11:13AM 10 it truly was. It says motion hearing, okay, actually, 11 all right, so that was the hearing. MR. ERCOLINI: That's correct. 12 1.3 THE COURT: You're saying there were rulings 14 that I made. Let's focus on the rulings, and then let's 15 go back and tie this very briefly to what happened, and 16 then I want to hear either from Mr. Ercolini or 17 Ms. Ybarra about this. 18 MR. ERCOLINI: Okay. So the two rulings, the two instructions were, and we discussed the topics 19 11:13AM 20 broadly because, as you said, we didn't have time to get into the nitty-gritty of all of them. 21 22 THE COURT: Right. 23 MR. ERCOLINI: The instruction was to the extent it existed, there was to be testimony, documents produced 24 showing the -- and I'd like to just get your language so 25

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that it's clear in what Google agreed to so that I'm not mischaracterizing. Just a moment.

So it was the analysis for the matter of the value of these TPU products to the businesses, so to the different business units, and I think again we read Topic 32. That was within the scope.

The other topic was average costs for data center, and that was in limits, so to speak. So we had a number of topics that all fell under that umbrella, in particular, fell under that umbrella. We knew on Friday that they had not prepared a witness for it, so we sought confirmation, and the following date -- I understand that the Court may not parse what Ms. Ybarra said, but it's conjunctive, and there was a requirement to do both, to both confirm that we would not seek additional time with Mr. Shafiei or any 30(b)(6) witness on these topics later.

If there's any ambiguity, I can tell you, your Honor, based on past experience, I know how any agreement that was subject to past agreements would have been characterized in a motion. We were not going to waive the right to seek additional testimony on a witness that we hadn't confirmed was prepared.

THE COURT: Okay. I think I've got the picture, and I want to hear from Google, but let me just offer one

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part, which is, you know, this idea of requiring lawyers or deponents or whomever to agree to conditions that, you know, you won't seek to do something in the future, you know, generally those are unattractive because nobody knows what's going to happen in the course of a proceeding, nobody knows whether there's going to be good grounds to revisit a prior deposition, new information becomes available, the deponent makes a statement that reveals new information that comes up for the first time or they say something that's inconsistent with some discovery that's been produced, and to ask somebody at the outset of a deposition to agree that there will be no further inquiries, to me, I would be weary of that from the beginning. I don't think they're necessary.

I understand the concern you have, you want to make sure this is not an exercise of perpetuity, but there are other ways to go around it. The rules provide the mechanics and the guiding principles when somebody says I want go back and ask more questions to somebody about a certain subject.

Usually if there are protections to be provided, they are pretty well set out in the rules, and I'm not a fan of these, you know, essentially these limitations that you're being asked to sign onto at the beginning, so

that's my thoughts on that.

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Let's go to the essence on this. So, Mr. Kamber or Ms. Ybarra, let me hear from you. You guys always have the advantage in that you're dealing with not only well-versed in way more facts and science than I, but I tend to look at this big picture, so I know when I made those rulings that Mr. Ercolini is talking about, you know, those were kind of the two major points about which we were having some conversation, and it struck me as reasonable, Mr. Kamber, that they ought to be able to try to explore what the overall value, the benefit to Google of being able to use these components was or is, and beyond that, I didn't feel like I was capable of getting into the weeds to work out what that meant, so what's the issue from your perspective?

It sounds like what Mr. Ercolini is saying is these were questions that kind of fell safely into that as well as trying to figure out what the cost of a data center is, and thus, again, trying to be able to figure out what the benefit and the value to Google was in this case of these components. So what was problematic here?

MS. YBARRA: Your Honor, if I could start by saying we completely agree with you that this issue is a serious one and probably too complicated to fully resolve here. We think we have a real serious dispute over the

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scope of testimony that Google is obligated to provide pursuant to Singular's 30(b)(6) notice, which, as your Honor knows, has been the subject of months of meet and confer, multiple status updates to the Court, multiple motions to compel.

We think those disputes were resolved at the June 30th hearing by the rulings your Honor made from the bench, and I disagree with Mr. Ercolini's characterization of events regarding the depositions last Friday and this Tuesday, of course.

As you noted, we filed a motion for protective order last night submitting a written record, letters and e-mails and the transcript of Mr. Shafiei's deposition.

I think that contradicts what you just heard from Mr. Ercolini.

Google did not unilaterally terminate the deposition and did not fail to prepare a witness on the topics for which the witness was designated, and if you'll permit me to explain I think how we got here, I'd like the opportunity to correct the record.

THE COURT: Well, that's fine, but what I really want somebody to do is to give me a very concrete example of a question that was put to the deponent or an area where is clear we're going to be asking questions on this subject matter, and Google said no, either the deponent

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said I'm not prepared to answer that or Google said we're not going to have the person answer that, just so I can try to understand where the disconnect is here because you seem to be saying he's got it all wrong, so help me understand as you see it why there's no problem here.

MS. YBARRA: Well, your Honor, so

Dr. Nishant Patil is one of Google's Rule 30(b)(6)

witnesses. He was deposed last Friday. I don't believe

Dr. Patil answered in that manner to any of the topics for which he was designated, and I say the topics for which he was designated, as we discussed at the June 30th

hearing and as, you know, consistent with your Honor's rulings on the record, Dr. Patil was Google's designee on Topics 13. That topic concerns analyses prepared by Google regarding the benefits of the accused TPUs or the benefits attributable to the accused TPUs.

We talked about that at length at the hearing -THE COURT: Right.

MS. YBARRA: -- and we presented Dr. Patil on that topic, and he was prepared to testify and did answer questions related to that topic.

I think the problem we have here is your Honor made rulings, your Honor ordered Google to provide 30(b)(6) testimony consistent with what it had already offered Singular by the time we got to the June 30th

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hearing. You basically told us to make good on the offers to compromise that we had memorialized in our opposition brief, and in addition to that, you ordered Google to provide a witness to testify about analyses regarding the benefits attributable to the accused TPUs as well as the average cost to build and maintain a data center.

That latter topic, Google's 30(b)(6) witness who was supposed to testify, Mr. Shafiei, was prepared to testify on. You know, following the June 30th hearing, Google wrote Singular twice, and in one of those is a July 6th lengthy letter memorializing our understanding of our obligations and commitments coming out of the hearing citing your Honor's rulings from the bench.

Singular never disagreed with that. They didn't disagree with your rulings at the hearing, and you asked Mr. Ercolini multiple times have we resolved all of your issues, have we resolved all the issues, have we talked about everything you want to discuss?

So, the night before Mr. Shafiei's deposition this past deposition at 4 p.m., Mr. Ercolini sent Google an e-mail demanding that Mr. Shafiei, who was designated on 14 topics, that Mr. Shafiei be prepared to testify as to a quote, "the complete scope of those topics as originally drafted."

Those topics include topics that your Honor explicitly said were overbroad or were improper at the hearing, and we had a number of exchanges with Mr. Ercolini where he reiterated anything less than the complete scope of the topics as drafted Singular will consider a failure to appear.

It was clear from the night before that we had a huge disagreement about what Google's obligations were and what the thrust of your Honor's rulings of the June 30th hearing meant regarding those obligations, and we feel like Singular is acting like the hearing never happened and the, you know, the agreements that we reached with the Court or the rulings that the Court made from the bench never happened, and it's seeking testimony on the full scope of its original topics as drafted, which is not what we left the June 30th hearing understanding our obligations to be.

We asked --

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THE COURT: Take me back, not to cut you off, take me back to Friday for a minute. I'm still trying to understand what happened with Dr. Patil I think you said his name is that was problematic. They say it was an inadequate deposition.

As I listened to you, I didn't hear you suggest that there were any problems with that deposition. You

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say he was prepared to talk about everything that was in I think it was Topic Number 17, which kind of represented really the essence of what we were all talking about and how to value the TPUs and the like, so do you disagree with this assertion that he was — that he performed inadequately, that he was not prepared to talk about all of the areas that the parties had agreed would be fair game at that deposition?

MS. YBARRA: I absolutely disagree. Dr. Patil was extremely prepared, and he testified at length about documents and analyses assessing the value of the accused TPUs to Google.

He testified on numerous of those exhibits, and, frankly, I mean he both prepared for the deposition as a 30(b)(6), and that is as he testified, it's part of his every day job to be working with those kinds of analyses and assessments.

THE COURT: So what did you understand Singular's gripe about the Friday deposition to be as we sit here right now?

MS. YBARRA: Your Honor, Singular did not object that Dr. Patil was inadequately prepared at the time. They deposed him for nearly the full seven hours. I think it was 15 minutes less than that. They did not hold the deposition open.

The first time that we heard that Singular contends Dr. Patil was not adequately prepared was Mr. Ercolini's 4 p.m. e-mail on Monday night.

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It's really I think about after the fact, after the deposition, they realized they hadn't gotten the complete scope of their original topics as drafted and are now coming back and bring us back to square 1 really, and that is how we got to the instant at Mr. Shafiei's deposition.

You know, we asked Singular, we suggested that the parties postpone the depo so that we could seek guidance from the Court because it's clear we had a big disagreement here, and Singular refused and insisted that we show up with Dr. Shafiei at 9 a.m. on Tuesday morning, and so Mr. Shafiei appeared on Tuesday morning, and at the start of the deposition, I attempted to state our objections on the record to Singular's insistence that it could spend the day questioning Mr. Shafiei by asking him questions on topics that the Court had deemed improper that we did not agree to provide, you know, Dr. Shafiei as a witness on.

Mr. Ercolini suggested that I was contending that, you know, we'd only let Mr. Shafiei testify if Singular agreed to not ask for extra time. That's not quite right, your Honor. This was about we were not

going to put Mr. Shafiei up, have Singular ask him, you know, badgering questions all day about topics for which he was not supposed to be testifying and then go back to the Court and seek the complete scope of the topics.

Mr. Shafiei was not a 30(b)(1) deponent, he's only testifying as a corporate witness, and so it would be completely improper. Mr. Ercolini did not really allow me to even get my objections on the record. He consistently talked over and interrupted me.

THE COURT: So do we even know that there's going to be an issue with respect to Mr. Shafiei? I mean, no questions were even put to him, right?

MS. YBARRA: No, we do, we do know there's going to be an issue because Mr. Ercolini made very clear that he intended to examine Mr. Shafiei on the full scope of Singular's topics as drafted, and that includes, for example, the full scope of Topic 18.

This was a topic specifically discussed at the June 30th hearing that your Honor said that's too broad, we're not going to do that, and Mr. Ercolini did not agree that the Court limited Singular's 30(b)(6) topics in any way at the June 30th hearing, which I find really astounding.

THE COURT: Hang on, Mr. Ercolini. I don't have any of the paperwork in front of me. I can go back with

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my clerks and my staff, and we can try to reverse engineer, and, you know, we can sort of remember things that we said, but help me understand from your perspective, Ms. Ybarra, what was it that I said in my view, this is not proper, this is overbroad?

I do recall saying that, I just don't have the stuff here in front of me to read, but I do know that I was looking at some of this, and I was saying, yeah, I think this doesn't get to the nub of it, so what did I say was overbroad?

MS. YBARRA: Your Honor, it was in the context of talking about the topics seeking broad financial discovery into all of Google's unaccused products and services, like search and ads and things like that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. YBARRA: And we had talked specifically about Topic 18, although it wasn't identified by name, but, you know, it was recited almost verbatim into the record, and you expressed your opinion that that was overbroad and too sweeping, and after some discussion with Mr. Ercolini on the record, you ordered Google to produce a witness to testify about the value and benefits of TPUs and/or analyses about, yeah, value and benefit of TPUs. We agreed to do that.

You ordered Google to produce a witness on all

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of the compromised offers that Google identified in Exhibit D to its opposition brief and on the data center topics, you also agreed the full scope of the data center topics seeking detailed financial discovery into, you know, costs and projections related to data center. You said those were also overbroad. You said we're not going to get into, you know, how much for concrete, how much for this. You said, Google, produce a witness on the average cost to build and maintain a data center, and Mr. Shafiei was prepared to testify on that.

Mr. Ercolini was very clear about his intent to examine Mr. Shafiei not just on that data center topic but a whole host of others that your Honor had said no, those are too much, and that's where we get into -- that's how we got here.

THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Ercolini, hang on, let me go back to you because I'm really trying to do this in a way that I can actually understand as we're going along.

So we've got the issue with Dr. Patil on Friday where Google is saying they're kind of shocked to hear that you're saying that there was something improper or unsatisfactory about the way that was done, and then we've got the Tuesday deposition with Mr. Shafiei where it seems to me really we're arguing about the scope as

much as anything else.

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So let me go back to Dr. Patil for a minute. What is it that you say was improper about the way that Google and Dr. Patil behaved at that deposition?

MR. ERCOLINI: So Topic 32, again, to go back to that, that topic was squarely within, and I'll just say with respect to Ms. Ybarra's comments, I tried to read from the record, a number of the things that she said are factually incorrect, and I'd really like while we're all in the light of day to make sure that those things are run down so they don't just pass as accepted.

I did not demand that he be prepared for every single topic. What I asked him was to confirm what portions of the topics they would be preparing him for and what they would not because Mr. Patil testified on Friday we had an understanding of what the scope was based on your Honor's rulings, and that extended to other businesses, the benefits to other businesses, and Topic 32 is squarely within that, and Google, Ms. Ybarra said on the record that he would not be prepared to testify on that. They made their own rendition of the topic, which was a comparison of TPU v2 and TUP v3 vs. other machine learning hardware.

THE COURT: Hang on, when we talked on June 30th, did we talk specifically about topic

Number 32? I mean, did we use that number, or did we talk more about what's in Topic 32?

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 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ ERCOLINI: We talked about really exactly what was in Topic 32.

THE COURT: All right. So I did not make a specific ruling 32 is in, 32 is out, but you say I said the things that are mentioned in 32 I said would be fair game?

MR. ERCOLINI: I think there was only one topic that was explicitly discussed. We had a number of topics, and because we were short on time, we talked about how much we were going to get into other business units, and your Honor said yes, full Roth financials for those other businesses are overbroad, but if Google has done the analysis on other business units, if there are benefits to other business units and they're tied to the invention, that's within limits, and Topic 32 is squarely within that.

THE COURT: All right. Did you try to ask questions and were told I'm not prepared to answer, or was this something at the outset you were told he's not going to be answering anything in that area, and, thus, you never broached it?

MR. ERCOLINI: Well, your Honor, we were somewhat thrown for a loop by that and other topics.

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Other topics Google had said that we had modified the topic because we identified the portion of the topic that was disputed, and that was now modified somehow in our motion.

There were a number of other topics that basically Google took the chart that Ms. Ybarra actually said during Mr. Shafiei's deposition that the Court prepared and said that we're prepared to testify in accordance with this chart, which they said was agreed to long ago during meet and confers.

Mr. Kamber said during that hearing that we hadn't even met and conferred, but that topic, Topic 32 was squarely within. We had concerns over that and other topics during that deposition that Mr. Shafiei, who was to appear on Tuesday, and, again, we're three days out from the close of fact discovery.

THE COURT: Okay. But listen, hang on, hang on, you're kind of bouncing around. I'm focusing on Patil, right, because Ms. Ybarra came to this imaginary that the deposition came and went, and they didn't know until Monday that you had a problem with what went on last Friday.

What I'm trying to figure out is in your view, was that wrong? Was there something on Friday that happened where you said, hey, this is not compatible with

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whatever we were talking about with Cabell, or this was ruled to be an appropriate area of inquiry, and he's telling us that he's not ready to talk about this? Was there an event like that, or was this more upon reflection following the deposition, you had this kind of epiphany that it hadn't been as fulsome as you understood it to be?

MR. ERCOLINI: No, your Honor, they told us that he was not prepared to testify on that topic, and questioning the witness beyond that, you know, we could do that, but why are we going to do it when he says he's not prepared?

THE COURT: When you say that topic, you're talking about 32?

MR. ERCOLINI: I'm talking about 32. I have gone through other topics. Basically it was Google's rendition of what it took from the hearing, which was really a narrow version of that and what it said it agreed to, but that topic in particular is a glaring example of we're squarely within what the Court decided.

We asked about it. They told us he was not prepared to testify on it, he wouldn't be testifying on it, and Google substituted its own topic, which was much narrower and really kind of tangential to that topic.

THE COURT: All right. So, what is it you

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wanted to explore with Dr. Patil that you were unable to explore because either he wasn't prepared or they told you he wasn't going to be answering questions in that area?

MR. ERCOLINI: So, specifically any estimates of the value of Google to the benefits of using the accused products, including accrued search results, and we know they've done that analysis, advertising placement, increases in volume of search and advertising, increased revenues attributable to the TPU, accused TPUs, profits, advertising rates, and click-through rates.

We've seen analysis on that in documents. We did not get a witness who could testify on that.

THE COURT: Now, Mr. Kamber or Ms. Ybarra, I do recall saying that if there were analyses that already been done, then it seemed to me fair on balance to have a witness prepared to talk about them. Mr. Ercolini is saying, hey, these are things that were done, so why wasn't Dr. Patil ready to answer questions about those subjects?

MS. YBARRA: Your Honor, Dr. Patil was prepared to answer questions about analyses of the benefits attributable to the accused TPUs, and he did testify about that topic and several documents related to that topic at length, and I want to be clear, there's a

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distinction here between what I'm saying, analyses regarding the benefits attributable to the accused TPUs. That is Topic 17.

Mr. Ercolini is focusing on Topic 32, which is about quantifications and estimates of the value of the accused TPU, but then he goes on, including, you know, improved search results, ad placement, increased volume in search. It gets into the weeds on exactly what we discussed at the hearing, gets into the weeds on Google's unaccused products and business lines, but Dr. Patil did testify about what we told the Court we would produce a witness on at the hearing.

said because I agree with you, I wouldn't have been interested in green lighting inquiries into areas that really related more to nonaccused products, but you started by saying and he started, Mr. Ercolini started by explaining these were, he was just sort of probing in a logical way and going as far as he could in trying to quantify the benefit and the value and the gain to Google from using the accused products, and so if it turns out that we are a more efficient company, we are a more powerful company, our products work better and faster and we can quantify that, our advertising revenues go up because of this, and we can quantify that, that would

have fallen within the heartland of what I would have thought to be fair.

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So I'm hearing you say, you know, maybe some of this is really detail oriented, and reasonable people want to have mercy on a human being so they don't get overloaded with too much minutia, but as areas of inquiry, I thought I was suggesting that that was appropriate.

MR. KAMBER: Your Honor, if I could just interject here briefly, and then I'll turn it over to Ms. Ybarra because you mentioned me, and I said that at the June 30th hearing.

It's true, and I referred, I didn't refer to Mr. Patil specifically, but I said we have a witness who works on this stuff at Google, we will produce him as a 30(b)(6) witness.

That's on the record, and I said and we will produce the documents that he has that are analyses on these issues, the value, the quantifications, and subsequent to that hearing, we did produce those, including the impact on the ads business and other businesses.

That material has been produced, and I'll let
Ms. Ybarra address the issue, but he was examined on
those documents and those things that I said we would be

putting him up on, so I'll turn it over to her.

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THE COURT: Before you do, is this semantics? I mean, are you saying, well, he was questioned on this, but this is all missing the point here, which is they say that there were areas we would have wanted to ask him about where we couldn't because he wasn't prepared?

Now, one response to that is we produced the universe of what existed. There might be some stuff that he just doesn't know of because an analysis hasn't been done in a certain area, so fairly he cannot be compelled to answer something he doesn't know, but are you saying that anything that's out there we produced and he was ready to talk about anything like that?

Now, there might have been some areas where Singular might have been interested in getting information, but you know what, we just don't have complete information in that area, and, therefore, Dr. Patil couldn't be in a position to talk in an educated way about it?

I guess I'm trying to understand where is the point where we have the disconnect here where they say this is an area we understood he was supposed to be answering questions regarding, but for some reason, he wasn't because the way you guys are continuing to pitch this, he answered all the questions that were put to him?

MS. YBARRA: Your Honor, I think he did. I think maybe where the disconnect is that we agreed that Dr. Patil would be the designee in this area on this topic under Topic 17. Topic 32 is worded differently. It goes into more detail. We didn't agree, you know, we didn't ever say Dr. Patil wasn't prepared to testify on that topic, we said Google didn't agree to produce Dr. Patil as a designee on that topic.

We thought that the Court's order related to Topic 17, and this was the analyses about the benefits and value of TPUs were captured under that. As counsel, the examining counsel for Dr. Patil's deposition was not Mr. Ercolini, it was Mr. McGonagle, went through topic by topic and said you're prepared to testify on X, right? That is where I objected, and said no, that's not what we agreed to on Topic 32, but we did agree to provide that information on Topic 17, and Dr. Patil did testify.

THE COURT: Let me own the snafu here, all right. I'll take it because I certainly would have said, if we want to use 32 as a shorthand, that that seems to me to be fair as well because we're still talking big picture about how Google benefited from having these accused alleged products and being able to make use of them.

I would certainly be sensitive to an objection

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or a concern that the amount of detail that one person would have to master in order to be able to answer all of these questions is just going to be too much, so burden and the onerousness, but that's different from categorically speaking.

Categorically speaking, I think this still falls under the broad penumbra of benefit to Google, gain to Google from using these products, and, again, I go back to the conversation Mr. Kamber and I had, and he just acknowledged if there are analyses that have been done, and that includes an area like revenue and advertising and efficiency, I was assuming that what I was conveying was that the witness should be able to answer questions in those areas as well.

So if we had been talking about numbers, and it had really been sort of keyed up for me that way, I probably would have said, well, 17 and things related to 17 to the extent that they would allow Singular to have a better sense of how Google has benefited or how just generally the use of these products has affected what Google does, and then we could have fought about how far that goes and, you know, the like.

MR. KAMBER: I'm sorry.

THE COURT: No, go ahead.

MR. KAMBER: I just want to say, to be clear,

that's what I heard you say. That's what we heard you say.

THE COURT: All right.

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MR. KAMBER: And we were talking about it, I think, in the context of 17. We're not saying we didn't make a commitment on 32 or what have you. I think the point that we're making is we agreed to 32 sort of collapsing it with 17 to the same extent, that is, we've produced those quantifications.

Dr. Patil talked about those quantifications to the extent they exist. He's the person that does this. We're not sitting here today saying we made no commitment on Number 32 or we didn't hear you say explicitly you also have to do 32. That's very much within our understanding that we needed to present somebody on that topic.

I think the issue or the disconnect, as

Ms. Ybarra said, is how are we now interpreting that?

We're interpreting it the way that we talked about it at
the June 30th hearing, whereas Mr. Ercolini in the
written correspondence has said we needed somebody on
the, quote, "full scope of the topic as noticed," as
though none of the other things had come to pass.

THE COURT: Okay. So I guess I'm still not sure whether there's a "there" there as it relates to last

Friday. So, Mr. Ercolini, what I'm hearing collectively from Mr. Kamber and Ms. Ybarra is, yeah, 32 was fair game, and if you knew about it, I mean, if we had data and analyses and studies and information, then he could answer questions that related to that, so that really there is no issue with respect to that deposition last Friday because all of the topics that were considered appropriate were able to be explored. What do you say to that?

MR. ERCOLINI: Your Honor, we were given -- we gave a topic that was specific as to those things.

Analyses of the benefits of TPUs is a much broader topic, and it's very easy for counsel to object to that topic as being outside the scope or as potentially including anything. We were very specific.

THE COURT: Hang on. They're not saying it's outside the scope, that's where I'm getting a little frustrated. He's not saying it's outside the scope, he's saying it's within the scope. He's saying maybe we weren't calling it 32, maybe we were collapsing 17 and 32, but we understand what the Court big picture was saying would be fair game. We had the person ready to talk about it, and we didn't throw up any roadblocks.

Where are you saying the roadblock came in?
MR. KAMBER: So, your Honor, if I could

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interject.

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THE COURT: We can only have one person speaking at a time. Mr. Seeve, if you want to take this, that's fine, but what I don't want to do is trying to have a whole bunch of folks talking at one time.

MR. ERCOLINI: I do want to respond, your Honor, that Topic 32 was specifically the topic, and actually I will let Mr. Seeve speak because he actually was present at the deposition. We identified the topic, we asked him what he had done to prepare. They said he was not being presented on that topic. They're saying it was a disconnect, it was subsumed under a larger topic. I don't know why that would be, but there was an objection to scope to every question that followed, and the witness was not prepared to testify.

The witness merely answered, "That is what the document says," "That is what the document says," "That's what the document says."

THE COURT: So maybe what we explore, and I'll hear from Mr. Seeve in a minute, but maybe what we explore is just a supplemental, you know, we resume it for, you know, two hours or something like that and everybody goes in focused on something, but Mr. Seeve, let me hear you.

This sounds to me like these are things that

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happened, and these are things that can be dealt with again usually by the parties just getting back together for a very focused, limited no second bite type of exercise, but, Mr. Seeve, let me hear you.

MR. SEEVE: Thank you, your Honor, and good morning. I witnessed at least part of the deposition of Dr. Patil, and so I think I can maybe bridge the divide between what you're hearing from my colleague,
Mr. Ercolini, and what you're hearing from Mr. Kamber and Ms. Ybarra about the deposition that he was prepared to testify and did testify about all these topics.

I don't think you could call what Dr. Patil offered last Friday testimony. The exhibits to the deposition largely consisted of documents on which Mr. Patil was a co-author, often the first listed author, and he was asked about the contents of those documents, and the most he would offer in response is this canned response, "That is what the document states."

And we asked him, "Well, do you believe that to be true?" He said, "Well, that's subjective," even on documents for which he was the author, and I also want to say that every single one of these questions drew a scope objection from Ms. Ybarra, so to the extent that Google is now saying that they didn't object to the scope and that Dr. Patil's testimony was within bounds, as they

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understood those bounds, Ms. Ybarra didn't agree with that last Friday because every single question was objected on the basis of scope. I wanted to clear that up.

THE COURT: We've got problem-solving sleeves rolled up here. As long as that objection to scope was not followed by an instruction not to answer, I'm not going to be too worried about it, but go on because, again, I'm trying to focus on, okay, how do we deal with this? Go on, Mr. Seeve.

MR. SEEVE: Understood. And, your Honor, I just wanted to make it clear what we were talking about when we were saying that Dr. Patil was not fully prepared to answer these questions. It was just that he was giving these sort of canned nonanswers. To the extent he was prepared to testify about these topics, he didn't, and that's where we're coming from.

THE COURT: Here's what I propose, and I know you guys are sort of bumping up against some dates, and what I need to do is speak to Judge Saylor just to talk about some of this, but it does seem to me that it's probably appropriate under the circumstances to authorize another session with Dr. Patil but a limited session, one that really goes to addressing what may have been a good faith misunderstanding between the parties, so I'm not

prepared to make any findings here that one side has acted improperly as it relates to this, one side has gone outside the scope of what was authorized or that the witness was instructed to answer in a way that ran counter to the spirit of what I would have ruled, but logistically is this something that can be arranged on relatively short notice, that is, another session where Dr. Patil is able to be corralled for maybe like four hours and then counsel is given a chance then to explore these areas where it may turn out they get the same answers?

MS. YBARRA: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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MS. YBARRA: -- could I respond, please? So Mr. Seeve was not present for the whole deposition.

Mr. Ercolini was not present, and I disagree that I improperly objected on scope grounds.

The questions Dr. Patil was asked for hours consisted largely of Mr. McGonagle's, Singular's counsel, reading a sentence from a document and saying, "Do you agree with it?" "That's Google position, isn't it?" And sentence by sentence.

They were not proper deposition questions. They were a waste of time. It's not Dr. Patil's fault. He prepared for that deposition extensively, and I know

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because I was there, and he is a senior engineer at Google, and he took a lot of time out for this. If we're going to be ordered to make Dr. Patil available for deposition again, I'd ask that we have the opportunity to brief this and your Honor can see the transcript and you can see how Singular elected to spend seven hours with Dr. Patil on the record because it was not a productive day, and that's not the fault of Dr. Patil's.

THE COURT: Okay. Under the circumstances and given time, here's how I'm going to have to deal with this because, again, there's no pending motion before me. What I'm hearing from Google is they don't believe they have acted in any way that's inconsistent with the ruling I've made. I can't make a finding one way or the other. I wasn't there. I'm hearing the parties.

I do think that the easiest way to do this honestly, old school days, you get the person back in the room and you just ask some more questions, both sides proceed in good faith, both sides try to make the exercise as efficient as possible and try to figure out what the problem is the first time and steer around that and then with we're all done, but if we can't do that, there is no pending motion, I don't have a record in front of me, I don't have a transcript.

I think Singular, if you want to seek relief

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from this, if you're going to want an opportunity to re-question Dr. Patil in a manner that you think is consistent with my rulings and what he should have been prepared to do, I think you're going to have to file a motion.

You can do it on up an expedited basis, and I would make Google respond on an expedited basis, and we would just deal with this down and dirty, but I think that's the only way we're going to be able to get past this, so either it's that was a lesson that we don't have to re-learn or we will move on or we will seek relief from the Court and an opportunity to question Dr. Patil similar because it sounds like Google is saying they're not wild about this idea of everybody sitting back down together for a few hours, so that's how I would deal with that.

Now let's talk about Shafiei for a quick minute as it related to Tuesday, and, again, from what I heard half an hour ago, it sounded more like tempers may have escalated or passions may have escalated fairly quickly before anybody knew it, the deposition just kind of blew up even before it got started.

So, what can we do that's constructive here to deal with Shafiei and that deposition and to make it happen?

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MR. ERCOLINI: Make sure just that it happens immediately, your Honor, because we have three days left, two days left until the close of fact discovery, and we've been pursuing this for nine months.

You know, at the time of the deposition, there was no motion for protective order, there was no protective order. They can make their scope objections during the deposition, but pulling the witness was completely inappropriate, and we want to make sure we get the witness because those topics are very important to us.

THE COURT: So, Google, you don't have any objection to producing the witness for examination, right?

MS. YBARRA: We don't have any objection to producing Mr. Shafiei for examination on the topics that your Honor ordered Google to produce a witness on at the June 30th hearing. What we do object to is sending Mr. Shafiei in so that Mr. Ercolini can examine him on the complete scope of topics that the Court already deemed objectionable, and that's why we suspended the deposition. We did it pursuant to Rule 30(d) and so we seek relief.

THE COURT: Okay. Don't do that. All right. Here's the way you deal with it. You produce the

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witness, you've got everybody there. It's costing money. You have your witness there, and you have him answer the questions that you deem to be proper. You instruct him not to answer the questions you deem to be improper. If they don't like those instructions not to answer, they can then seek relief from the Court, and we can fight about whether they were outside the scope of the like, but I think that's the better course to do, the better course to follow, but really the issue is it seems to me a disagreement over what the scope is going into the deposition of what is permissible and what is not.

Is there anything that we can talk about now so the parties leave with a mutual understanding of what would be in bounds and what would be out of bounds for a deposition of this individual?

MR. ERCOLINI: So, your Honor, I will say from experience, you hear scope objections all the time during a deposition. That's usually an objection to whether a question is within the bounds of a notice topic. It's not an objection to -- it's not within the bounds of or it's outside the bounds of the topic that we substituted for the topic that you noticed.

They can make -- this is the one vehicle of discovery that is unique in this regard is that you have to produce the witness prepared because it's costing

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money because people have prepared, people are attending. It's time, it's money that you are expected to file a motion for protective order for the topics if you deem them improper.

THE COURT: Sure. We're actually, hang on, we're past that point. That's not responsive to what I was asking. I agree with everything you just said. My question is we're here now, so let's talk. Let's make sure there's a mutual testimony if we're going to go into that room and have that deposition of what's fair and what's not fair. Can we do that?

We got all these smart people, reasonable people here who know what the real issues are in this case. I mean, I like to think if I turn it over to you guys just to start talking, we can figure out really quickly either there's no disagreement or here are the few areas where we have disagreement.

Somebody help me understand. You know, imagine ourselves in the room, the deposition is starting, you're asking the questions. Where are we likely to have that first instance where somebody is -- where Google is saying objection as to scope?

MS. YBARRA: So, your Honor, I think on the several topics that Mr. Ercolini was intending to question Mr. Shafiei on regarding detailed financial

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discovery into data centers, your Honor ordered Google to produce a witness on one data center topic, the average cost to build and maintain a data center, and we were prepared to do that. As soon as Mr. Ercolini gets beyond that, we're going to have a problem.

THE COURT: Okay. No, no, you're not incorrect, but I fear that you're putting way too much into a shorthanded way of me articulating what I thought was reasonable. What I said was and what I tried to convey was if you can generally come up with an average cost for building one center because we know not every center is created equal, there's always going to be different needs and different requirements and the like, and just, you know, the real estate part of it is going to drive some differences, but I thought that would be a fair proxy to help Singular understand and to help people quantify this part of it in trying to understand the benefit or the gain or the effect to Google on Google of being able to use the accused products.

Beyond being able to come up with an average amount, obviously, if there was more information there that is not at the level, the granular level of how much did we spend on nails and hammers but somewhere in the middle without me trying to define what that was. I was trying to convey -- I'm not here to say that that's out

of bounds.

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I mean, they have a right to explore how Google benefited from the use of these products, and if that can be accomplished by providing some information and helps one generally to understand, you know, we had to build five less of these types of buildings and building other types of buildings or constructs that we would have had to work on, we could do it for half the cost.

I mean, so I think this is going to be more than somebody saying here's what the average cost of a center is, and I was leaving it to you guys as creatures of reason to kind of figure out a mid-point where Singular gets generally this information so they can quantify the potential on damages and harm but nobody has to worry about getting receipts from Home Depot about what the price of concrete was. I mean, that's what I was trying to convey.

MS. YBARRA: Your Honor, I think we've -MR. ERCOLINI: If I may, your Honor, we can
actually I think short-circuit this because Google has
already done that analysis through and through on
megawatt requirements.

We've received a number of documents on that, documents that we've recently produced that we've been requesting through discovery. We have those. We have

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detailed financials on the data centers, on their power draw, on their space requirements.

Those documents it appears were prepared in a number of cases for the litigation, so I think that those documents that have recently been produced should be within bounds, and I think that's a good midpoint. A lot of those are detailed analyses on the financial benefits of the TPUs, how many they have deployed, what the power draw is, so I think that that's probably a good midpoint where we're not asking about the nails, how much concrete was poured, and those are really the main issues that we're concerned with in the litigation because those are the main benefits that are derived by the invention.

It is reduced power, and it is reduced footprint, and so I think based on the documents that they've produced, I think those should be within the scope of what they're offering, and that was exactly my concern, your Honor, was that all we were going to hear about was what's the average cost for a data center because they've given us detailed information that's a lot more granular than that, and it really does vary. It varies by county. It varies by where the real estate is.

There is no quote, unquote, "average data center." There's only 10 at issue. It's not like we're going to be all over the map on this. It's pretty

drilled down and really the spreadsheets are one sheet apiece for the most part.

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THE COURT: In your opinion, Mr. Ercolini, how much time do you think you would need to explore this in a deposition?

MR. ERCOLINI: Mr. Shafiei is a 30(b)(6). We've got I think seven hours with him.

THE COURT: I know you've got seven hours. I'm just curious how long do you think it would take to explore all this stuff?

MR. ERCOLINI: It depends on what the objections look like, to be honest. We're going to be very straightforward. We don't want to waste time on this. To be honest, we would have loved to have gotten done last week, and, you know, we will be as efficient as possible because we are dealing with a deadline, and I think there are maybe a dozen depositions due to take place over the next two days. It's not like we have the resources to just be, you know, keeping him in the chair. Nobody wants to do that.

MS. YBARRA: Your Honor, can I please respond to Mr. Ercolini's comments and your comments, your Honor? You're exactly right, there is a middle ground, and the documents that Mr. Ercolini is referring to are documents that Mr. Shafiei was prepared to testify about.

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Google's, you know, spreadsheets on capital expenses for data centers, operating expenses, retrofit costs. He prepared extensively to testify on those, and we will put him up on those.

We weren't interpreting your Honor's order that we produce a witness on the average cost to, you know, build and maintain a data center narrowly, we were doing it in good faith, and we have the witness ready to go.

Where we're going to run into a problem, where the fundamental dispute will be is when Mr. Ercolini asks the witness are you prepared to testify on the full scope of Topic X as drafted, and the witness, you know, when the question is asked ignores everything that we're discussing here.

THE COURT: So why does that need to be asked? Why do you need to ask a question like that? Why can't you just get into these areas, and, you know, I'm trying to come up with a great analogy, and, you know, that's the problem trying to coming up with one, but, you know, we can all find many examples where you ask the question you didn't really need to ask and thus created an issue that may not have been there because I'm listening to both sides.

Honestly, I'm not hearing that there really is an issue, I'm hearing there's concern about this language

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that has -- the witness that he or she is really supposed to be prepared to talk about everything that's ever happened at every time, but I hear Mr. Ercolini saying that's not our interest, we don't want to do that, so why can't we just have an understanding that here, the scope of what we're talking about here, questions that are based not only on what we talked about, the general cost of these centers but also reasonable questions that flow from the information that has already been provided by Google to Singular on these topics so there's no chance of a surprise by being shown a document that they haven't seen before?

This is all kind of coming out of things that strikes me Google will know the witness is likely to be asked and thus will be prepared to answer. Can we just agree to proceed that way?

MS. YBARRA: I would hope so, your Honor, but Mr. Ercolini's rhetoric and his e-mail comments the night before threatened to seek sanctions if the witness testified he was not prepared to testify on the full scope of the topics as drafted, and that is the backdrop against which we're having this conversation.

THE COURT: I can say that sanctions, I mean, it's always, you know, a volatile word to bring up, but sanctions would really only be appropriate in a context

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like this if the witness was refusing to answer whether on instruction or not questions in an area where it was already clear either from the Court ruling or from the parties' understanding that that was going to be an appropriate area of inquiry.

Now, we're here, it seems to me we got some consensus as to what those appropriate areas are if we for the moment, you know, Singular, I'm thinking, you know what, I'm not going to go in and somehow for some reason try to get the witness to sign something or agree that, yes, I'm going to be prepared to answer in all of these areas, and Google is going in and thinking we need to have this person ready to answer fair questions in all of these areas.

Maybe Google would decide at the end or maybe Google can go in, even know there's a motion for protective order pending and saying, you know, we can hold that in abeyance, and Singular can say we will hold in abeyance our potential concerns that we're going to get blind-sided by a surprise objection and maybe an instruction not to answer because it could be that neither of those concerns rears its head in this deposition and this deposition goes without issue.

Can we just try to get this on board and start this and see how it goes? You've got seven hours, right?

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And I know when we have meetings like this, I mean, it's on everybody's radar screen. I think everybody is going to be now highly vigilant about exploring those areas that are fair and kind of staying on point and just moving along and letting Mr. Shafiei then get back on with his life.

If we were going to proceed that way, when can we get that deposition to take place? It was going to be on Tuesday. That didn't happen. When can it happen?

MR. ERCOLINI: If the witness is prepared, we can do Friday. We want to do it before discovery closes.

THE COURT: I mean, obviously, I have to talk to Judge Saylor whose deadline that is, but I think that, you know, where we're talking about this, we can probably assume that if it has to spill over into next week or something like that, that's not going to be an issue.

Still, we should be looking to do this as soon as practical. Google, when can you have Mr. Shafiei ready to be deposed?

MS. YBARRA: Your Honor, certainly not tomorrow, I think just owing to his schedule, but Judge Saylor did say it was okay with him if depositions spilled over to July 31st. I need to check with the witness and find out when he's available, but we'd aim to do it within that time frame.

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THE COURT: Okay. I would say to the witness only because I've been here before, not with you guys, but in many cases, sometimes they may need to be made to understand they may need to alter their schedule, and that's not really a power argument as much as it is a moving train, and everybody's got to play their part, so I'm sympathetic.

We are in the heart of vacation season. We're encountering this issue a lot, but if you do talk to him, just help him understand the sooner he does this, the better it is for everybody, the case moves along.

MS. YBARRA: I don't think we'll have a problem on that front, I just don't want to commit to a specific day on the record here where I haven't checked with him at all.

THE COURT: All right. I'm just going to leave that to the parties then to solve the logistics on that.

Now, let me go back for a quick minute to Dr. Patil. I'm not going to revisit all that, but I am going to say that that, I think, Singular, the ball is in your camp. If you do think that things went so poorly that there should be an opportunity for a redo, you're just going to have to file something ASAP and we'll deal with it that way, otherwise unless you guys talk and/or you conclude that on balance it's not necessary for you

or worthy for you to go back and try to do that one again.

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MR. SEEVE: Understood, your Honor. Thank you. We'll confer, and we'll decide whether or not we think it's egregious enough to file something, but that makes sense to us, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So those are the obviously, you know, our two big things. I don't have the e-mail in front of me. I looked at it quickly. We've been going for an hour and 15 minutes. We don't have too much longer. We're probably over the time we allotted, but is there anything looming that you think in a few minutes we can do something productive on?

MR. ERCOLINI: Your Honor, there are just a couple of topics, and I think we can make this very quick. We'll be very pragmatic about it.

There were a number of topics for which designations were not provided. We're not going to get into the rule, but one of those is Google's return on investment policy.

This is a very key issue in this case because, you know, based on the capital expenditures that Google has made on the TPUs, the return that they're suggesting is -- it's sort of astonishing, but its corporate return on investment policy, what it expends, and they produced

CapEx, they produced OPEX.

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In terms of what it expects to get in a return and profits, we should know about that because they had this project going for several years. It's a key part of most damages analysis nowadays, and so we would like to get that topic designated, and we're not sure why it was left off. There are a number of others one, but just to be pragmatic that one is very important to us.

THE COURT: All right. So you've designated somebody to talk about that. Google, do you have problems with that, or is this just something you haven't gotten to?

MS. YBARRA: Your Honor, this is one of the subjects raised in our motion for protective order. We have told Singular that Google does not have an official corporate ROI policy, and that's why we're unable to designate a witness on that. We've had that conversation multiple times now.

As to the other topics for which Google did not designate a witness, those were agreements -- those were agreements reached with Singular in prior meet and confers that memorialized in our opposition to Singular's motion to compel that we feel like Singular has reneged on in the last 48 hours, and so I think there's still issues in the protective order need to be addressed, and

that's one of them.

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THE COURT: I think those then will have to be subject of motions, I just don't know that we're going to be able to sort of go through and work through --

MR. ERCOLINI: I can make this very simple, your Honor. If their contention is that that corporate return on investment policy does not exist, then have someone say it under oath that it doesn't exist, and it's as simple as that, then we have it under oath, and we have that response from Google.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question. Why can't -- I mean, did you ask it in an interrogatory? I mean, those are usually signed by somebody that can bind the company. Wouldn't that give you the same? I don't know that we want to force people to all come together and spend all that money just to have somebody say that under oath if you can do the same by getting it in a written interrogatory.

MR. ERCOLINI: Well, there's a 30(b)(6) witness coming up. It seems like it would be very easy to prepare him on that topic, but we are past the interrogatory deadline. We're well past the deadline for written discovery, and we had a limited number. You know, we've gone back and forth on a number of those. It's the only vehicle, and it's the vehicle that we

chose, and, you know, we basically --

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THE COURT: I mean, I guess I don't know how I feel about that, and so I don't want to say something off the cuff that I later, you know, change, but I'm a little bothered by it because when you've got counsel making a statement say in response to a discovery request that we don't a policy on this, usually you're not entitled to then say, do you know what, bring somebody in under oath and let me ask the question, just prove it.

Now, here's the asterisk. If you've got a basis to suspect that answer is incorrect and thus it does warrant further exploration, that's different. I don't know enough about the details here, you know, to know one way or the other whether that's something you should just be accepting as a statement either from counsel or, again, if it were in response to an interrogatory, I understand you didn't ask it in an interrogatory, but I quess, Google, you know, on the practical side of things, if there are going to be other depositions, why can't you just have somebody as part of that say, you know, by the way, I am here to tell you we don't have an ROI policy, and that way they've got it under oath, you're not wasting time by having a whole lot of questions put to somebody in that area, but if it turns out later that that's incorrect, well, Singular has established that for the record, and if it turns out it is correct, then it's neither here nor there, and it took five minutes to establish that.

MS. YBARRA: Your Honor, just to be clear, we told Singular that Google does not have an official corporate ROI policy on May 14th. That was 10 days before the deadline to serve written discovery, and Singular in fact served interrogatories after that date. They didn't ask this question. They also didn't move to compel testimony on this topic.

This is part of a larger problem that we reached agreements on several topics on Singular's 30(b)(6) notice that they have now abandoned at the eleventh hour and are saying that Google has somehow acted improperly. That's really a larger fundamental problem we're having here with Singular's --

THE COURT: I don't think anybody is saying they're acting improperly. Let me ask you, on May 14th, when you made that representation, was that a representation by counsel, or was that -- I mean, how was that conveyed?

MS. YBARRA: That was conveyed by counsel in a meet and confer on Singular's 30(b)(6) topics, the one that we're speaking about now.

THE COURT: Mr. Ercolini, if you were to get a

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letter from counsel on behalf of Google stating in simple throws, Google has no corporate ROI policy, would that be sufficient for your purposes?

MR. ERCOLINI: Well, your Honor, to the extent we find evidence that contradicts that there is no ROI policy, following up on that would be extremely important.

THE COURT: I mean, that's my whole point, if what they say is true, you're not going to find anything, I'm just trying to figure out a way that we can do this and make this a nonissue.

If you can establish for the record they have taken a position on whether there is or is not a corporate ROI policy, and it's about as official as it gets, we've got an officer of the Court representing Google who is stating to us in a letter that is being written solely for this purpose to tell us one way or the other whether it exists.

I can tell you, if you then find something that suggests something in opposite to what's in that letter, yeah, you'll have a basis for asking the Court to do something.

My question is, okay, if you get that letter though now, does that diffuse this as a potential issue because otherwise I think the way we're going to have to

deal with this is it will have to be briefed.

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I mean, that's just time and money, you know, because I'm hearing you could have asked about this in an interrogatory. You didn't. It was raised prior to the deadline. You still didn't ask. You were actually told in a meet and confer it doesn't exist, and so, gee, we don't think we should have to bring a human being in and put them under oath just to affirm something we already told you.

MR. ERCOLINI: Judge, Ms. Ybarra said there were a number of agreements prior to the motion to compel that we filed, but we filed a motion to compel on several topics that they claimed we had agreed to.

The requirement is that they designate someone. If they say that something doesn't exist and we disagree that it does, we're not at an obligation to put that into another form of discovery. They have to designate someone, and if it's just to designate someone to testify that it doesn't exist, I can tell you, your Honor, we have indications that that does exist.

THE COURT: That's different. So, 1, I don't know whether I agree with you that if they tell you something doesn't exist, they still have an obligation to produce somebody to talk about it. I don't know that that's true, but here's the part that matters.

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I mean, you're telling me, do you know what, I have a basis to believe it's not true, so that's the concern. If that's the concern, I would say, you know, what, Google, you should just have somebody prepared to come in and spend five minutes to say, I don't care what you heard, it doesn't exist, but, Singular, if you think it does, show them what you got. I mean, tell them here's why we think there is something there.

Maybe the lawyers don't know what somebody else in the company might know, and maybe this is just a matter of, all right, a little more conversation, internal conversation on their side, and, you know, something might come up, and that might, again, help this move along, but I don't want something as simple as this to all of a sudden end up being the subject of a whole bunch of motions back and forth where you guys are sort of close to the end of things.

MR. ERCOLINI: It sounds like according to Google, they think it's relatively noncontroversial, so I don't think it should be if what they're saying is correct, but, you know, if we have countervailing evidence, I think we have an obligation to our client to look into that.

THE COURT: Are there still depositions to take place on subjects where the likely designee for those

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subjects would also be somebody who with credibility would be able to say whether there might exist or does not exist a corporate ROI policy because if the answer is yes, we're still going to be deposing somebody on the corporate side of things to talk about A, B and C, why not just throw this in and with an understanding that all the person is going to be prepared to do on that is state one way or the other whether there is a corporate policy?

Now, Mr. Ercolini, if we go that way, I mean, here's what I wouldn't want to have happen, all of a sudden some surprise where all of a sudden you bring out some documents and you say, well, what about this? I mean, I'm not interested in setting up that sort of exercise, but if you really have a legitimate basis, if you have a legitimate basis to worry that there is a policy, help them understand why that is the case, and then I might be more amenable to saying, you know what, in light of this past where they've already told you this and you had an opportunity to explore it, I'm still going to say, okay, go ahead and try to depose somebody on this.

Is that something you can do, or is this sort of on information or belief or your understanding of how businesses operate and how it just seems to you to be just so unlikely that they wouldn't --

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MR. ERCOLINI: No, no, I don't think it's based on inference, and I have to speak with my expert about it, but my understanding is there is pretty specific policies, and I'll just say because you asked about the witness that was available to testify on this, potentially, Mr. Shafiei who did not appear on Tuesday is the finance manager and capital markets analyst for Google. He's been there for 11 years. I think if there's a return on investment policy, he would probably, if he doesn't know, he could probably be educated on it fairly quickly, and it's as simple as that.

We're not intending to go on a fishing expedition. It's not worth our time to go in there and say, oh, that's incredibly unlikely, are you kidding me? We'll go in with specific evidence.

Giving that to counsel before the deposition when they're telling us that it doesn't exist, I don't know how comfortable I feel about doing that. I don't think it's entirely fair to Singular to have to disclose why it doesn't believe what Google has told it and to provide the evidence so that they can, you know, come up with a prepared response for why it's undercut by that.

You know, impeachment really doesn't work that way, but we're not trying to get anyone, we're just trying to establish whether or not it's true and then,

you know, what are the indications that it's not when they say...

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THE COURT: So, Google, here's what I would suggest, respectfully, to you folks, to the lawyers, I think you need to go back and talk to your client, and I think what you have to say is, look, based on what we're talking about in court, Singular really has a basis to think there's a policy. We've said there isn't. The Court thinks, the Court says if there is a policy, it's probably okay to ask questions about it, and we'd have to make somebody available.

We, the lawyers, don't want to have egg on our faces by it becoming apparent that there is a policy when we said there isn't, so maybe if you can have a further conversation with somebody on this, but having said that, Mr. Ercolini, I still don't know that it's appropriate for me to do anything, I mean, to rule at all.

I mean, I take counsel -- you know, lawyers are officers of the Court, and when they come in and they say we've made a statement as to something, I don't have a basis to challenge that, and I understand you don't want to necessarily tip your hand by explaining why you may disagree with it, but if you're not going to do that, I don't really have a basis to say, well, I'm going to make them designate somebody anyway.

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Here's the principle I'm worried about because I can tell you are shaking a bit. The principle I'm worried about, it can't be the case that one side can say we have no policy in the following areas and then yet be compelled to produce somebody under oath to talk about those areas, even if it's just to say, as we indicated before, or as you were told before, there is no policy, absent some evidence to suggest that that first assertion may be incorrect, and if you can't give me that, I just don't know that I can do anything.

MR. ERCOLINI: Your Honor, if I could just respond to that. If Google's going to go back and ask its client whether or not there's a policy, I want to be clear about what that means. It doesn't necessarily mean oh, well, there's a document that says here's a return on investment policy or here's a one sentence return on investment policy, but what Google suggested in this case is that essentially a 400 to 1 capital investment to profit ratio for a project that's gone for five years is somehow within the bounds of their return on investment policy.

We have a right to probe whether or not Google would have made an investment like that and continued a project whose capital expenses were 400 times the profits of what they say, you know, the invention gave them.

I think that that's -- it's a very sensible topic, and it's clearly something that smacks of absurdity to suggest that probing that I think is important.

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I want to just make sure that when they go back and say is there a policy, someone doesn't say, well, there's no policy because the policy is defined as, well, there's a document that says here's our policy. It's probably grayer than that, but I do think that we have a responsibility to probe that, and that is a responsibility to our client.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. KAMBER: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Maybe there's a couple of different things there. One, it sounds like you're almost talking about somebody said something about 400 to 1 differential. That's not necessarily the same as saying there's a policy, but, anyways, Mr. Kamber, what do you say?

MR. KAMBER: We can go back and talk to our client about this, but the problem is it's the day before the close of fact discovery and this is coming up, and just to set the table, Mr. Ercolini and I met and conferred on the 30(b)(6) topics on May 14th, including the ROI policy, and we said there isn't somebody, we

can't put somebody up.

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If Mr. Ercolini said, you know what, I think you do have somebody, you should go back and figure this out, then we could have done something about it at the appropriate time. That was over two months ago, but here we are.

We had our objections. We noted them. They did not move on the ROI topic. They moved on various different 30(b)(6) topics. We came into this court, we said we have a dispute about this number, I think it was 16 at the time, but I can't be sure. We said there's a dispute. Do you have any other disputes? No.

This was not a topic that was moved on. We listed it in that Exhibit D to our opposition as one where we had met and conferred. We had not offered a witness, and they had not moved on it.

To be here now and to have Mr. Ercolini -- this is a different issue than we had a fight about scope, and there's some disagreement about what the Court may have ruled or may not have ruled, there's no disagreement here. This was not moved on, this was not ruled on, and --

THE COURT: Hold on, the fact that it was not moved on or ruled on is a bit of a red herring here because really the issue here is a really simple one. Is

there a policy or is there not a policy? You guys say no. They say we think there might be.

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Now, then all those other things come in and add these layers to it, so we're going to trying to analyze this, you know, then we might have to consider, well, did you raise this timely? Was it the subject of a specific conversation? What's your basis for thinking there might be something? You know, who was it that made the statement that we don't have anything? Is that reliable?

But it all begins with is there a policy or is there not? I guess I don't know, Mr. Kamber, why Google seems to have some resistance to listening to you guys, although you haven't said explicitly.

Having somebody prepared to say, yeah, we've looked, I mean, you keep asking about this ROI policy. We don't have anything like that. So, you know, do with that what you will.

Are you resistant to that? I get it, you say we already talked about this, but if we're going to have Mr. Shafiei, if we are going to have a deposition that's going to take place probably within the next five days or so or six or seven days, and this really is a nothing burger, why can't we just roll it in and say without waiving any objections we have to your right to even try to be exploring this at this juncture, we'll have

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somebody there just to remove any ambiguity and to declare, as we told you before, that there is no policy. Is that something that you have a problem with?

MR. KAMBER: A little bit for two reasons, your Honor. One is the practical one that, you know, if Mr. Ercolini had thought this was an issue, we could and should have been talking about it before where he said, you know, sorry, counsel, we don't believe you, we think there's this other thing, and we could have figured this out over the last two months.

The other one is that this is clearly now an attempt at sandbagging. This isn't about a 30(b)(6). He's saying I need you to put somebody up because I've got dirt on you and I want to cross-examine the guy, and that's the only reason.

He doesn't want to ask the question, do you have an ROI policy, he wants to hit whatever this witness is over the head with whatever documents or whatever information that he has. That's not really the appropriate thing at this point, particularly given the history here.

THE COURT: I mean, well, and just sort of playing that out one step further, Mr. Ercolini, kind of a victory if they do not know what it is you would want to probe and they thus can't -- it's most likely they're

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going to have somebody there who is going to say we don't have a policy that I know of, and then all of a sudden you produce a document that suggests differently, well, that witness still isn't going to be able to give you any information because he or she wouldn't haven't been prepped on whatever it is you've got in your hand.

They would have been operating on the same information that Mr. Kamber and Ms. Ybarra have, which is there isn't anything here, so I mean, then you'd be stuck having to come back before the Court and saying, okay, this is what happened, and now I want an opportunity to probe some more about this, so, you know, I don't know what to tell you guys.

MR. KAMBER: Can I raise one other practical -MR. ERCOLINI: The complaint seems to be that we
didn't believe them enough at the time that they --

THE COURT: No, no, no, that's a mischaracterization. No, the complaint is you didn't raise it, you didn't put it on the radar screen. They told you in mid-May there's nothing there, and now all of a sudden we're hearing at the eleventh hour that you want to have somebody there to talk about it, and, in fact, you do think there's something there. That's the issue.

MR. ERCOLINI: Your Honor, the obligation, again, I hate to go back to what the requirement is for

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depositions in 30(b)(6). If you fail to designate, you have failed to appear, and they failed to designate. We are not required to move to compel. It is the one vehicle of discovery.

THE COURT: What's your authority to support that proposition when what you heard from counsel was there is nothing on this particular subject, so there's nobody to put before you to talk about it? Are you saying that even in that instance, they need to have somebody there to affirm that there is nothing there, and the failure to do that would in essence be a failure to appear?

MR. ERCOLINI: Your Honor, during the June 30th hearing, we heard the analyses that didn't exist, you know, were subsequently produced.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ERCOLINI: So we can credit what counsel says, but we're going to do that to a point, and to go back to your point, they just say that it doesn't exist, then, you know, even if it ends there, at least we have a confirmation on the record that that's the case, and if it proves not to be true, you know...

THE COURT: Let me do this. Why don't I do this. You guys tell me, you know, I was thinking I'm offering something that's an easy way out and both sides

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tell me, no, that doesn't work. Why don't I authorize one supplemental written interrogatory, ask the question. You're going to get Google responding under oath, I mean, you know, somebody binding Google.

You can have time to go back and formulate the question that would give you the information that you're looking for, and then we can proceed based on that. You guys can go back and pound that out right now and send it over to them this afternoon. How about that?

MR. ERCOLINI: It is a different vehicle of discovery, your Honor, because they can withhold the response based on objections.

THE COURT: No, there's no objection. We can talk about that right now. You're right, we're here right now. I don't know what the objection would be.

It's relevant if it exists. If there's a policy, I don't know why it would be onerous or burdensome to produce it, right?

We're not talking about going back and crafting something, we're saying if you got this, you know, does something exist, and, if so, I guess maybe a supplemental RFP as well, give us a copy of it.

MR. ERCOLINI: I can tell you what the objections to that are going to be, We object to the term corporate return on investment policy as vague,

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ambiguous, overbroad, and we're going to get a response that is subject to those objections.

THE COURT: But you could define it, you could define it, you can say when we use that term, we use it to mean any number of documents that might go by a similar names such as blank, blank, blank or blank.

The rules require a party, even if they're objecting, to identify whether there is responsive information, so we need to know whether it's worth it to have a fight, so even if they object, Google would still have to say there is something actually out there that's responsive to this request, we just don't want to use it.

It gets something, but you're not wild about that I can tell.

MR. ERCOLINI: I expect to then see an objection to the definition. I just think a deposition just answering that question, even if it's just that question.

THE COURT: What's the question going to be?

MR. ERCOLINI: Is there a corporate return on investment policy?

THE COURT: And if the answer to that question is no, you're going to come up with a document, and you're going to try to get this person to then answer a series of additional questions that they're not going to be in any position to answer, and then what do you do

with that?

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MR. ERCOLINI: Well, that they are not on the documents, that they didn't author the document, they wouldn't have had knowledge of it by some other circumstantial evidence.

There are other reasons that they might have reason to know that. In terms of how far beyond that we probe, I don't think it's anyone's interest on going on a fishing expedition, but, you know, we're not trying to hit someone over the head. We are actually trying to get at that information because it's important for expert reports.

Even getting that they said no corporate return on investment policy exists response, you know, I've said my peace on that. I'm not wild about the interrogatory because I don't want to be here in a few weeks on a motion to compel for response.

THE COURT: I'm also not necessarily wild on the principle about compelling them to have somebody prepared to answer something where they've already told you there was nothing there and you're not prepared to explain why you disagree with that, so that's more from a kind of middle.

You can imagine somebody in my position, the precedent that that may create in future cases where

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somebody will say, well, just because they represented under pains and penalties of perjury they don't have anything, you still should tell them to do all these other things, so I'm worried about that.

Mr. Kamber, Ms. Ybarra, what can you offer as a way to completely diffuse this? Can you have somebody -- well, if it's the person we're talking about, can you have him prepared to offer any information on this as to whether there is something reassembling a policy understanding that if they say no, they may then be shown a document and asked, you know, the sort of standard, do you recognize this or do you not recognize this?

MR. KAMBER: I mean, I think I could fairly say that we could have Mr. Shafiei or somebody else give what they know. Part of the issue here is that it's 30(b)(6) testimony. This is a witness who's prepared for hours. He's talked to at least half a dozen, maybe 10 people in preparation for the testimony because, as Mr. Ercolini pointed out, there are a lot of spreadsheets, detailed spreadsheets we produced that he has prepared himself to testify on, and any of those conversations he could have asked, hey, by the way, do you know of a corporate ROI policy, but we can't redo that, unfortunately.

THE COURT: I understand.

1 MR. KAMBER: The problem is it's late.

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about that, we're talking about doing it now, about asking one person, giving an opportunity do you know anything about this, but the difference being you guys ahead of time now have the foresight and the opportunity to sit down with the designee to say, look, you're going to get a question in this area. It behooves us all to know whether there's something there or not.

MR. ERCOLINI: And counsel actually already knows that because they already told us that it doesn't exist, they've asked Google, so whomever they asked I think should probably be the person to speak with Mr. Shafiei.

THE COURT: Well, I don't instruct folks on how to go about preparing their witnesses, but I'm sure they understand how things work there and would do this appropriately, so...

MR. KAMBER: And we need to figure out if
Mr. Shafiei is the appropriate person. Mr. Ercolini says
he is, but Google gets to pick who it is that's going to
testify on this topic ultimately. As a practical matter,
it may be him, but it may be that we want or need
somebody else, for better or worse.

THE COURT: Well, I was just thinking only

because if you guys are concerned about wrapping these things up --

MR. KAMBER: Right.

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THE COURT: -- and this really is going to be the tail of the tail of a dog, it just seems to me the easiest way to do it is just to have him prepared to comment on it and then go from there.

Mr. Shafiei, I would take no position though of what happens if, you know, you end up with a transcript that shows we asked the witness, we showed the witness a document, the witness was not prepared to answer all of the questions we had about that document, and we now, therefore, should be entitled to do more.

I don't know how I would react to something like that in light of this record. I'm just saying I haven't had a chance to think about it, so you shouldn't assume that if we go through this exercise and you get an answer like that that it's going to mean that further discovery is going to be appropriate, and you'd have to go very incrementally at that point.

MR. ERCOLINI: I agree, your Honor, and hopefully we don't come to it. I desperately hope that we don't come to it because I would love discovery to come to an end.

THE COURT: All right. So, now, again, we're

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not ruling on anything. I mean, we're talking about possible ways to address some of these issues, and it does seems to me that we have come up with some things that could be a way in terms of how to deal with some of these.

So I think, Mr. Seeve, you said you guys will go back and reflect as it relates to the Friday deposition and whether you wanted to do anything with respect to that.

As it relates to the Tuesday deposition, maybe we're going to have that take place next week and people rather than sort of bear their chest and start articulating all their worries at the outset will actually just get into the deposition, and hopefully it will go without issue, and Google will, it seems to me, is going to consider having that person maybe also be a person who can put to bed this issue of whether there is an ROI policy, and Singular will just roll with the flow, and if that gives rise to any further issues, we'll deal with those when they arise.

One thing I may regret, but I'll just say it, if you tell me the day the deposition is going to take place and I am here, sort of like with the Superior Court, where you could sometimes when a deposition issue arises just reach out to the Court and get the ear of somebody

1 and saying, look, here's an issue, what do you think about this, I'm okay with making myself available in that 2 regard if you want, so if you want me to sort of just be 3 loosely on standby, if you want to let Ms. Russo know 4 5 when the deposition is going to take place, there's no 6 obligation to reach out to me at all, and I'm also not committing that I would automatically be available, but 7 if it is a day I'm working, I can offer that. 8 9 MR. ERCOLINI: We greatly appreciate that, your 12:48PM 10 Honor. 11 THE COURT: All right, so let's go that way. 12 It's 12:48, people must be hungry, so is this a good time 13 to call it a day and let people get on with their lives 14 or is there anything else? 15 MR. SEEVE: Your Honor, there is one other issue 16 that was raised in our letter, and I hate to prolong. 17 THE COURT: I shouldn't have asked, I should have set we're all set. 18 MR. SEEVE: I think I can cover it in 15 19 12:49PM 20 minutes. 21 THE COURT: That's too long. We would have to 22 take a break. If it were five minutes, I'd say let's 23 rally and let's do it, but I know Ms. O'Hara has other 24 obligations, as do I. I'm sorry, we just did not expect 25 that we were going to be actually going beyond noon

1 today.

1.3

12:50PM 20

12:50PM 10

MR. SEEVE: Understood. If your Honor would allow me, I could try to cover it in five.

THE COURT: The problem is there's stuff that's going to be coming from the other side and it's going to be a discussion, that's the part. You might be able to cover it in five, I just don't think we can resolve it in five.

Ms. Porto, you were going to say something?

MS. PORTO: Your Honor, I was just going to say

Google has some outstanding discovery requests we were
hoping to discuss very briefly.

THE COURT: I do think that probably we're going to have to resolve it now. As it relates to outstanding discovery requests, if these are things where there's a request and for some reason it hasn't been responded to and now they're saying to our surprise they don't have to respond to it and we think that's an issue and we might be filing a motion, that's what we convene these informal conferences for, not so much is this going to be coming, we haven't heard from them. That, I think you guys need to work out yourselves, so I'll leave you with this in closing:

1, let Ms. Russo know if you want me to be on standby; but, 2, in the interim, why don't you guys talk

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and say, if we get back together with Cabell, here's sort
       1
       2
            of a small list of things that we do think we can talk
       3
            about with him and deal with within the span of an hour,
       4
            and then I'll try to make time for you guys sort of
            within the next few days. We can't just do it anymore
       5
       6
            today.
       7
                     MR. ERCOLINI: Thank you, your Honor.
       8
                     MR. KAMBER: Thank you, your Honor.
       9
                     THE COURT: Thanks, everybody, good luck with
12:51PM 10
            things going forward. I'm sure I'll be talking to you
      11
            soon.
      12
                     MR. ERCOLINI: Understood, your Honor, thank
      13
            you.
      14
                      (Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at
      15
            12:50 p.m.)
      16
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      22
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1	CERTIFICATE
2	
3	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT)
4	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS) ss.
5	CITY OF BOSTON)
6	
7	I do hereby certify that the foregoing
8	transcript, Pages 1 through 83 inclusive, was recorded by
9	me stenographically at the time and place aforesaid in
LO	Civil Action No. 19-12551-FDS, SINGULAR COMPUTING LLC vs.
11	GOOGLE LLC and thereafter by me reduced to typewriting
12	and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.
13	Dated July 26, 2021.
L 4	
L 5	s/s Valerie A. O'Hara
L 6	
L7	VALERIE A. O'HARA
18	OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
L 9	
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21	
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